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Duke Law Journal Online 
VOLUME 63 DECEMBER 2013 
EMERGENCY POWER AND TWO-TIERED 
LEGALITY 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY† 
Commentators have long debated how to think about the 
relationship between law and presidential power during emergencies.  
Three distinct positions have emerged in that debate.  First is the 
strict approach: that the president is subject to the normal 
constitutional and statutory laws even during emergencies.  Second is 
the accommodation approach: that constitutional and statutory law 
should be interpreted to allow for more expansive presidential power 
during time of emergency.  Third is the extralegal approach: that 
exercises of emergency authority should be understood as operating 
outside the law, potentially with some sort of after-the-fact evaluation 
of whether the exercise was functionally or morally justified.1 
Each of these approaches has potential drawbacks.  The strict 
approach’s denial that the interpretation of constitutional and 
statutory authority changes during times of emergency seems naïve 
and threatens to make the law either too restrictive or too 
disconnected from actual practice.  The accommodation approach, by 
 
Copyright © 2013 Curtis A. Bradley. 
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comments and suggestions, I thank Kathryn Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, and Eric Posner. I have 
had the pleasure of knowing Dick Fallon since I was a student in his constitutional theory 
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 1.  For discussions of these three perspectives, using somewhat varying labels, see 
generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of 
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989); and Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of 
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND 
COMPLACENCY 39 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). 
BRADLEY IN PRINTER PROOF (POST-THIRD BRADLEY REVIEW) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2013  12:34 PM 
2 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 63:1 
allowing governmental authority to expand during time of perceived 
emergency, may allow the government to opportunistically ratchet up 
its power and may create precedent that could distort the law during 
more normal times.  The extralegal approach, by placing exercises of 
emergency authority outside the law, may leave these actions 
unregulated and undermine the rule of law, and it may be unrealistic 
if it depends on an acknowledgment by public officials of illegality. 
In his thoughtful essay, Richard Fallon has added to this debate 
by suggesting an approach that attempts to keep emergency power 
within the domain of law while reducing the danger that exercises of 
this power will corrupt the rest of the law.2  Analogizing from 
“threshold deontology” in moral theory, Fallon suggests a distinction 
between the rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation that 
apply during normal times and those that apply during emergencies.  
Citing Justice Holmes’s observation that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad 
law,”3 Fallon’s chief concern is the “problem of normalization: powers 
created for emergencies spill over their originally intended banks and 
become the norm.”4  His approach, he suggests, addresses this 
concern while retaining the rule of law.  It also “fits our historical and 
contemporary practices for gauging the scope of executive 
authority.”5 
At first glance, Fallon’s approach may seem to be a restatement 
of the accommodation approach.  After all, his claim that “[w]hen 
consequence-based imperatives possess sufficient urgency, it is right 
to conclude, as a matter of law, that the president can do some things 
that would be flatly illegal or unconstitutional under the ordinarily 
applicable rules,”6 is precisely the claim made by accommodationists.  
But Fallon’s position is potentially distinguishable in two respects.  
First, Fallon hypothesizes a two-tiered model that involves both 
normal law, akin to what is envisioned by the strict approach, as well 
as a category of emergency law, with the latter limited to “highly 
exigent cases.”7  Second, Fallon suggests that presidential actions that 
can be legally justified only in the emergency category “should be 
regarded as lesser legal evils that are regrettably in breach of,” and 
 
 2.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Interpreting Presidential Powers, 63 DUKE L.J. 347 (2013). 
 3.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 4.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 367. 
 5.  Id. at 352. 
 6.  Id. at 351. 
 7.  Id. 
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not wholly reconcilable with, “ordinary legal and constitutional ideals 
that emergency does not eradicate.”8  By having the emergency 
category conceptualized as narrow and as tainted, the hope is that it 
will be sufficiently cabined to avoid corrupting the rest of the law. 
Fallon’s analogy to threshold deontology is useful in highlighting 
some of the dilemmas that emergency power can pose for the law.  
Nevertheless, I have doubts about the need for, or usefulness of, two-
tiered legality.  As an initial matter, it is not clear that the idea of a 
regrettable lesser evil has broad relevance to real-world issues of 
statutory and constitutional law relating to presidential power.  In 
addition, I question whether Fallon’s central concern—that the 
accommodation approach will lead to the creation of precedent that 
will corrupt the rest of the law—is borne out by practice.  
Nevertheless, I understand Fallon’s anxiety about the danger that the 
executive branch might extend its authority by tendentiously relying 
on past practices.  This anxiety, I would suggest, relates to the general 
role of historical practice in informing presidential authority rather 
than anything specific to the emergency power context, and I 
therefore question whether a two-tiered legality approach would do 
much to address it. 
I. THE IDEA OF LEGAL REGRET 
Perhaps the most novel contribution of Fallon’s approach is to 
introduce the element of legal regret.  As he explains, 
[B]y analogy to the moral wrongs that threshold deontology 
sometimes regards as lesser evils, some presidential actions that are 
justified only pursuant to the second-tier principles governing 
exigent cases should be regarded as lesser legal evils that are 
regrettably in breach of ordinary legal and constitutional ideals that 
emergency does not eradicate.9 
Regarding “even justified invocations of emergency interpretive 
principles as inherently regrettable or even dirty-handed,” he 
contends, can help prevent “the spread of principles framed for great 
cases to more ordinary ones, even in the field of national security.”10 
 
 8.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 352. 
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I am sympathetic to the idea of regrettable lesser evils as a 
matter of moral theory.11  It is not clear to me, however, that this idea 
has much applicability to debates over the scope of presidential 
authority.  As an initial matter, there is some ambiguity in Fallon’s 
essay about what he means by regret.  Presidents, like anyone else, 
could regret finding themselves in circumstances that require 
extraordinary action.  That sort of regret could presumably apply any 
time that a president decides that he or she needs to take action that 
involves a reduction in liberty.  We regret that we need to imprison 
criminal offenders or shoot enemy soldiers.12  But that sort of regret is 
not regret about the legal basis for the action, which is what Fallon 
appears to have in mind when he refers to “the legal equivalent of 
morally dirty hands.”13  Under Fallon’s conception of regret, 
presidents should understand that there is something legally 
problematic about what they are doing—a “lesser legal evil”—even if 
they determine that it is the best course of action. 
Most exercises of presidential emergency authority, I would 
suggest, are not understood as occasions for the sort of legal regret 
that Fallon has in mind, and it is not obvious that we should expect 
them to be understood that way.  When Lincoln stretched the law to 
save the Union, or Roosevelt stretched the law save Great Britain 
from the Nazis—Fallon’s most prominent examples—the presidents 
were not acting with anything analogous to moral regret.  They 
regretted that circumstances led them to do what they did, but those 
circumstances were not their fault.  And those are the most extreme 
examples.  In other emergency situations, like President Carter’s (and 
President Reagan’s) response to the Iran hostage crisis—another of 
Fallon’s examples—it is even more difficult to discern the ostensible 
basis for legal regret. 
The best example for what I think Fallon has in mind is torture.  
Many of us think that torture should be categorically unlawful and 
that the functional need for torture should not be balanced against its 
 
 11.  For a defense of threshold deontology, see generally EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010).  For criticism, see generally Larry Alexander, 
Deontological Constraints in a Consequentialist World: A Comment on Law, Economics, and 
Morality, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD., Aug. 2011, at  75, and Larry Alexander, Deontology 
at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2000). 
 12.  Cf. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 17 (2004) (“It is necessary that criminals be punished, but the suffering that 
punishment causes remains an evil nonetheless.”). 
 13.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 372. 
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unlawfulness.  Nevertheless, we might be willing to acknowledge that 
in an extreme situation, the best course of action is to engage in 
torture—for example, when there is a very high likelihood of saving 
innocent lives.  In that situation, one can imagine that the person 
ordering the torture would feel personally tainted by the decision, 
even though he or she decided it was the right thing to do.  Moreover, 
we might want an interpretive system that encouraged such taint, on 
the theory that it would make torture unlikely to occur except in truly 
extreme circumstances. 
One can quibble with whether this example fully works for 
Fallon, but that is not my concern. Instead, my concern is that, 
although Fallon purports to be building a theory for the general 
problem of emergencies, the theory will not help with many real-
world examples.  Perhaps the use of nuclear weapons to save a state’s 
existence might be one, although thankfully the world has not seen 
any such use in war since 1945.  What torture and perhaps the use of 
nuclear weapons have in common is that, at least for some people, 
they should be subject to a categorical legal ban, and yet there might 
be an acknowledgment that in an extreme case the ban should be 
violated or should not apply.  Importantly, most real-world reductions 
in civil liberty associated with assertions of emergency power do not 
have this character.  In thinking about whether the government is 
going too far with electronic surveillance, for example, no one thinks 
that there should be a categorical ban on reductions in privacy.14  
Even for something like seizing the steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,15 it is not generally thought that a presidential 
seizure of private property could never be legally appropriate, just 
that it was not warranted in that case.  In a case in which it would be 
warranted, the exercise of this authority would not be an occasion for 
legal regret. 
If I am right, then Fallon’s approach may not have the 
descriptive fit that he cites as one of the justifications for his 
approach.  The rarity of legal regret’s applicability also raises 
questions about the usefulness of the approach going forward.  If the 
idea of legal regret is implicated only in very occasional situations in 
which there is a categorical ban on action—situations in which there 
 
 14.  See generally, e.g., CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: 
TORTURE, PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2010) 
(distinguishing between torture and surveillance). 
 15.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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will typically be a strong overlap between moral concerns and the law, 
thus making the analogy to moral theory especially apt—then it might 
be better to address that concern by leaving those occasional 
situations as outside the law (as some have proposed with respect to 
torture).  Such an extralegal approach may actually do a better job 
than two-tiered legality of ensuring regret.  As Mark Tushnet has 
explained, “If emergency powers are extra-constitutional, decision 
makers can then understand that they should regret to find 
themselves compelled to invoke emergency powers.”16 
II. THE DANGER OF PRECEDENT 
Fallon’s proposal of two-tiered legality is motivated by his 
concern that judicial or nonjudicial precedents developed in 
emergency situations will “contaminate the resolution of future, more 
ordinary cases.”17  Fallon is vague, however, about the mechanism 
through which such contamination will occur. 
Let us consider first judicial precedent.  Fallon mentions 
Korematsu v. United States,18 in which the Supreme Court infamously 
upheld the forced expulsion of Japanese Americans from certain 
areas on the West Coast during World War II, and he quotes Justice 
Jackson’s concern in that case that a rule created for an emergency 
situation may “lie[] about like a loaded weapon.”19  An immediate 
problem for Fallon is that Jackson turned out to be wrong about 
Korematsu.  Instead of lying around like a loaded weapon, Korematsu 
has been thoroughly repudiated and is not something that either a 
president or the courts would likely feel comfortable citing as 
precedent. 
In situations like Korematsu, when hindsight suggests that the 
invocation of emergency power was unjustified, we might actually see 
the opposite of what Fallon fears.  Instead of becoming a dangerous 
precedent, it may cause interpreters and the public to be more wary 
about similar-sounding claims because they will have had the 
 
 16.  Tushnet, supra note 1, at 50; cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Judicial Oversight, Justice, and 
Executive Discretion Bounded by Law, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 135, 140 (James 
Fleming ed., 2011) (“[W]e should hesitate before developing a general theory of constitutional 
law based on an event as unique as the Civil War . . . [and] we should hesitate before developing 
a general theory based on the ticking time bomb scenario.”). 
 17.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 348–49. 
 18.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 19.  Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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experience of an unfounded one.  Perhaps the more recent 
controversy over waterboarding, and the Justice Department’s 
related “torture memos,” now have this character. 
But what if the earlier exercise of emergency power is thought, 
even in hindsight, to have been justified?  Will those precedents at 
least present a danger of corruption?  Even for this situation, I am 
skeptical because it is not clear to me why subsequent audiences 
(judicial or nonjudicial) would be led to ignore the circumstances that 
made the earlier exercises of power justified.  Fallon mentions as an 
example Lincoln’s actions at the outset of the Civil War, including his 
unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  Importantly, 
however, no president has attempted a unilateral suspension of 
habeas corpus since Lincoln, and that includes President Bush after 
the September 11 attacks.  Again, the danger of corruption does not 
appear to have materialized even when the earlier exercise of 
emergency power has been blessed in hindsight.  Instead, the Lincoln 
precedent is understood narrowly. 
In the context of judicial review, it is easy to see how there is a 
check on the corrupting influence of precedent: the courts will decide 
whether a new case falls within the parameters of the precedent, and 
in doing so they can evaluate whether there is an equivalent 
emergency.  If Bush had tried to unilaterally suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus within the United States after September 11, he likely 
would have lost in the courts, regardless of the precedent of Lincoln’s 
actions.20  To take another example that Fallon mentions, consider 
Dames & Moore v. Regan,21 in which Presidents Carter and Reagan 
required that billions of dollars in claims pending in U.S. courts be 
litigated before a new tribunal in The Hague, as part of their 
resolution of the Iranian hostages crisis. In upholding this exercise of 
presidential authority, the Court emphasized the “narrowness” of its 
decision and made clear that it was not attempting to lay down any 
general guidelines “covering other situations not involved here.”22 If a 
president attempted such a dramatic limitation on private rights in a 
 
 20.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), all nine Justices appeared to assume that 
only Congress may suspend the writ. See, e.g., id. at 536 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have made 
clear that, unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the 
Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, 
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of 
detentions.”). 
 21.  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 22.  Id. at 661, 688. 
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situation not presenting such unique facts, he would likely lose, as did 
President Truman in Youngstown. Assuming this is correct, then 
Dames & Moore is not a loaded weapon that threatens to corrupt the 
law concerning more normal exercises of presidential authority.23 
What must most concern Fallon, therefore, are situations in 
which judicial review is unlikely. As he notes, “[B]ecause disputes 
about the outer limits of presidential power to keep the nation safe 
and to manage international affairs seldom ripen into justiciable 
controversies, the president—aided by a team of lawyers—frequently 
functions as the principal precedent-setter in these areas.”24 In those 
situations, Fallon observes that there is a danger that the executive 
branch will invoke precedents from emergency situations and seek to 
extend them to situations that do not genuinely involve an 
emergency. I have no doubt that this phenomenon occurs. What is 
less clear to me is how such tendentious invocation of precedent will 
make a meaningful difference in the exercise of presidential power. 
As a background matter, there is a general question of what 
constraints presidents face in the absence of judicial review.25 
Whatever the answer to that question, it is not clear, precisely, how 
invocations of precedent by the executive branch reduce those 
constraints. If the constraints are predominately political, then those 
constraints should be unaffected. If President Bush was politically 
constrained from invading Iraq in 2003 without congressional 
authorization, that would not change if he tried to cite the Korean 
War (or the Kosovo bombing campaign) as precedent. If the 
constraints also have a legal component, then it is unclear why 
audiences that care about that component would be moved by 
problematic invocations of precedent. 
Fallon discusses at some length the U.S. military intervention in 
Libya in 2011, but that example does not provide direct support for 
 
 23.  For additional criticism of the claim that emergency-power precedent will carry over 
into nonemergency situations, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE 
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 136–38 (2007). To be clear, the relative ease 
with which the Court in Dames & Moore found congressional support for the presidential action 
may constitute an important precedent in discerning whether presidents are acting with 
statutory authorization, but that point is not specific to the emergency-power issue. 
 24.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 349; see also id. at 362 (“The cause for concern may be 
especially acute, moreover, when the president and lawyers in the executive branch not only 
establish, but also apply, the central precedents.”). 
 25.  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, 
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013). 
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his argument. In reasoning that President Obama had the legal 
authority to initiate military operations in Libya, the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) cited to past precedent, but the precedent cited 
involved relatively small-scale interventions rather than protracted 
conflicts like the Korean War (although the Korean War was 
mentioned as an example of how it is in the interest of the United 
States to support the United Nations).26 This reasoning therefore is 
not an example of emergency precedent being used as authority for 
more normal exercises of authority. Moreover, OLC specifically 
acknowledged that the president might need congressional 
authorization before initiating “prolonged and substantial military 
engagements . . . involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to 
significant risk over a substantial period.”27 Fallon does not take issue 
with OLC’s analysis of the issue.28 
What Fallon understandably finds problematic is the subsequent 
claim by Obama administration lawyers (but not OLC) that the Libya 
operation was not subject to the terms of the War Powers Resolution 
because U.S. forces were not engaged in “hostilities” for purposes of 
the Resolution.29 Fallon expresses particular concern about the 
Obama administration’s reliance on past tendentious interpretations 
by the executive branch of the term “hostilities,” observing that “[a]n 
executive branch unbounded in national security matters by any legal 
limits that it has not chosen to acknowledge would deviate sharply 
from traditional notions of constitutional legality and the ideal of the 
 
 26.  See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Authority To Use Military Force in Libya, 
35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7, 12 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-
military-use-in-libya.pdf (“[I]nstances of such presidential initiative have only multiplied, with 
Presidents ordering, to give just a few examples, bombing in Libya (1986), an intervention in 
Panama (1989), troop deployments in Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 
2004), air patrols and airstrikes in Bosnia (1993-1995), and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia 
(1999) . . . .”). 
 27.  Id. at 8.  For an argument that the historical precedent cited by OLC did not support 
the Libya action, see Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the 
Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.F. 1, 3–4 (2011), available at 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon_Final-Version.pdf. 
 28.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 388–89. 
 29.  See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th 
Cong. 8–9 (June 28, 2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State) 
(“[A] combination of four factors present in Libya suggests that the current situation does not 
constitute the kind of ‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day automatic 
pullout provision.”). 
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rule of law.”30 This is surely correct, but it is worth noting that the 
Obama administration was not specifically invoking emergency 
precedent and seeking to extend it to a non-emergency; instead, it 
was simply continuing a pattern of tendentious interpretation. Two-
tiered legality is not particularly responsive to this phenomenon. 
III. HISTORICAL GLOSS 
Arguments based on historical practice are a common feature of 
debates and decisions relating to the constitutional separation of 
powers. This is especially true in debates and decisions relating to the 
scope of presidential power. Unlike the extensive list of powers 
granted to Congress, the text of the Constitution says relatively little 
about the scope of presidential authority. Responding in part to this 
limited textual guidance, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the 
importance of historical practice to the interpretation of presidential 
power in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case. In his 
view, “[I]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American 
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to 
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”31 With some 
variations, the Supreme Court, executive-branch lawyers, and 
academic commentators have all endorsed the significance of such 
practice-based “gloss.” 
Many of Fallon’s concerns relate not to the divide between 
emergencies and nonemergencies but rather to the potential for 
abuse of the historical-gloss approach to interpreting presidential 
power, especially in the absence of judicial review. This is an entirely 
fair concern, and Trevor Morrison and I have outlined some reasons 
for interpreters to be cautious before crediting such gloss.32 As we 
have discussed, the executive branch is structurally better suited than 
Congress to engage in unilateral action that can lead to an accretion 
 
 30.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 365. 
 31.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); see also id. (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have 
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the 
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
 32.  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
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of practice, and there are reasons to doubt Congress’s ability and 
willingness to resist such accretions of authority.33 
Importantly, however, nothing in Fallon’s two-tiered legality 
approach will prevent this phenomenon, since the accretion of 
authority can occur entirely within the first of Fallon’s two categories. 
For example, if President Obama had initiated the use of force 
against Syria in 2013 (as he initially planned to do), his reliance on the 
precedent from 2011 with respect to using force against Libya would 
arguably have involved an extension of the precedent, but it would 
not have involved an effort to invoke a “loaded weapon” developed 
in an emergency. Instead, it would have simply been an example of 
more commonplace legal argumentation about how historical practice 
informs the scope of presidential authority. Presidents do not need an 
emergency (whatever that means) to be opportunistic about that 
dynamic. 
Even for those situations in which a president is specifically 
trying to extend emergency-power precedent, the two-tiered system 
may not offer much protection. Fallon wants to set the threshold for 
an emergency high, but he also wants the emergency category to be 
sufficiently capacious that it will be relevant in practice. The result is 
a standard for emergency that is fairly vague: Fallon proposes 
distinguishing between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” claims of 
presidential power and “limit[ing] extraordinary claims to truly 
extraordinary cases.”34 But what constitutes extraordinary is left to 
interpretation and debate.35 Moreover, Fallon says little about what 
presidential power should cover within the emergency category, or 
whether or to what extent that power should vary depending on the 
nature of the emergency.36 As a result, one should expect to see the 
same tendentious dynamic in this category that we can expect to see 
under Fallon’s first category. 
Ultimately, I would suggest, the checks on the abuse of 
nonjudicial precedent will come either from the courts, in situations 
 
 33.  See id. at 438–47. 
 34.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 351. 
 35.  Cf. Gross, supra note 1, at 1070 (“Unfortunately, bright-line distinctions between 
normalcy and emergency are frequently untenable, as they are constantly blurred and made 
increasingly meaningless.”). 
 36.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 390 (“Acknowledging the scope that two-tiered theory 
leaves for disagreement, especially insofar as it fails to prescribe a full set of first-tier 
interpretive principles, I would insist only that two-tier theory frames the right issues for 
debate.”). 
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in which judicial review is available, or from nonjudicial audiences 
(Congress, elites, and the public, among others), not from creating 
additional categories. In determining the weight to accord historical 
practice, courts could take into account some of the institutional 
realities about congressional-executive relations. For example, in 
determining whether Congress has acquiesced in an executive-branch 
practice, courts should probably be wary of making inferences from 
mere congressional inaction. They might also want to pay more 
attention to various forms of congressional “soft law” such as House 
and Senate resolutions.37 Moreover, when courts credit historical 
practice, it may make sense for them to describe their holdings in 
minimalist terms (as the Court did in Dames & Moore) to help reduce 
the danger that the precedent will be relied upon out of context.38 For 
historical practice that is unlikely to be subject to judicial review, 
audiences are obviously not required to credit tendentious 
invocations of practice by the executive branch, especially where the 
executive branch is simply relying self-referentially on its own prior 
views (such as in connection with the “hostilities” issue relating to 
Libya).39 There might also be ways for Congress to reduce the 
likelihood of executive-branch misuse of emergency precedent, 
through framework statutes, statutory sunset provisions, and the like. 
Not only would a two-tiered legality approach add little to these 
checks, it would introduce a distinction that would likely prove 
artificial in practice. As Fallon acknowledges, statutory and 
constitutional interpretation is already affected by consequentialist 
considerations, and presidential power therefore varies depending on 
the level of functional necessity.40 If that is correct, then it is probably 
too simplistic to hypothesize two states of interpretation—“ordinary” 
and “extraordinary.” Instead, it seems more accurate to hypothesize 
presidential power as operating along a spectrum. Of course, we do 
 
 37.  For discussion of congressional soft law, see generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s 
Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012), and Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: 
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008). 
 38.  See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 
(2006). 
 39.  This is not to suggest that a longstanding executive branch position is entitled to no 
weight by external audiences. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 32, at 460 (explaining that 
there are “plausible grounds for even nonexecutive actors to credit patterns of executive 
practice, at least in some circumstances”). 
 40.  See Fallon, supra note 2, at 370 (noting that “nearly any theory of statutory or 
constitutional interpretation is likely to be applied in practice in a way that is context-
sensitive”). 
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already use one type of categorization in this area: the three 
categories suggested by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in 
Youngstown for assessing the relationship between congressional and 
executive power.41 But it is worth recalling that Jackson described this 
as “a somewhat over-simplified grouping,”42 and that the Supreme 
Court has since observed that “it is doubtless the case that executive 
action in any particular instance falls not neatly in one of three 
pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from 
explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional 
prohibition.”43 In any event, the Jackson framework, like the 
influence of consequentialism, already allows for a lot of interpretive 
flexibility, reducing the need for a special interpretive regime for 
emergencies. 
The example that Fallon invokes as most reflective of two-tiered 
reasoning is Lincoln’s explanation for his actions at the outset of the 
Civil War, including his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Lincoln famously asked in a speech to Congress, “[A]re all the laws, 
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”44 He also noted that there was no question that 
many of his actions were “strictly legal,”45 thereby perhaps suggesting 
that some of his actions might not have been defensible under 
ordinary principles of legality. It is easy to forget, however, that 
Lincoln’s “all the laws but one” statement was a backup argument, 
and that he said that “it was not believed that this question was 
presented.”46 His main argument was that he had not violated any 
provision of the Constitution. With respect to the suspension of 
habeas corpus, he explained that 
the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the 
[suspension] power; and as the provision was plainly made for a 
dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the 
instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its 
course, until Congress could be called together; the very assembling 
 
 41.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 42.  Id. at 635. 
 43.  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 435 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 
 44.  President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 
4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 45.  Id. at 428. 
 46.  Id. at 430. 
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of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the 
rebellion.47 
This strikes me as a strong interpretive argument in light of the 
circumstances that Lincoln faced rather than some sort of lesser legal 
evil.48 
CONCLUSION 
Because my focus has been critical, I should emphasize two 
points. First, it is much easier to critique a theory, as I am doing here, 
than to develop a new theory, as Fallon is attempting to do. Fallon 
deserves great credit for suggesting and defending a new approach to 
such a difficult topic. Second, Fallon’s analysis is quite nuanced and 
insightful—more so than I have probably been able to convey—and, 
as a result, it is an important contribution to the debate over 
emergency power even if one is not ultimately persuaded by Fallon’s 
proposed approach. Among other things, the analogy that Fallon 
offers to threshold deontology provides a useful reminder that legal 
analysis, like moral analysis, cannot always be expected to produce 
“algorithmically correct answers” and that it ultimately requires “a 
faculty of judgment that is not itself rule-governed.”49 In this respect, 
although Fallon begins his essay with the quote from Holmes about 
how great cases make bad law, the Holmes aphorism that may be 
more apt is the one about how “[t]he life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience.”50 
 
 
 47.  Id. at 430–31. 
 48.  See also DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 163 (2003) (“[A]lthough the 
constitutional issue can hardly be considered free from doubt, on balance Lincoln’s use of 
habeas in areas of insurrection or actual war should be considered constitutionally appropriate, 
at last in the absence of any contrary action by Congress.”). 
 49.  Fallon, supra note 2, at 377. 
 50.  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). Holmes 
continued: “The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and 
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics.” Id. 
